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ON (NOT) BELIEVING THAT GOD HAS ANSWERED A PRAYER 
Brian Embry 
 
[Draft forthcoming in Faith and Philosophy, published online DOI: 10.5840/faithphil201811694] 
 
Abstract: Scott Davison has raised an epistemic challenge to the doctrine of petitionary prayer. Roughly, the 
challenge is that we cannot know or have reason to believe that a prayer has been answered. Davison argues 
that the epistemic challenge undermines all the extant defenses of petitionary prayer. I argue that it does 
not. 
  
Judaism, Christianity, and Islam all advocate the doctrine of petitionary prayer: we should use prayer to ask 
God for things, and God will sometimes answer those prayers. In his (2011) paper and again in his more 
recent (2017) book, Scott Davison raises an epistemic challenge to the doctrine of petitionary prayer. In the 
(2011) paper, Davison argues that we can never have any reason to believe of a prayer that God has 
answered it. This fact allegedly “undermines all the extant defenses of the practice” of petitionary prayer.i In 
his more recent book, Davison argues at length for the less ambitious claim that maybe we don’t know of any 
prayer that God has answered that prayer.ii As weak as the latter claim is, Davison still thinks that it 
“appear[s] to undermine some of the most popular defenses of petitionary prayer.”iii  
 There are two ways to respond to Davison’s epistemic challenge. First, the defender of petitionary 
prayer might argue that we sometimes do have reason to believe (or we sometimes do know) that God has 
answered a particular prayer.iv This strategy implicitly grants or suggests that if we do not have reason to 
believe that God has answered a prayer, then the extant defenses of petitionary prayer are indeed 
undermined by Davison’s epistemic challenge. If the arguments developed for this strategy are found to be 
problematic, then the doctrine of petitionary prayer will be to that extent impugned. The defender of 
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petitionary prayer would be in a more stable position if it were shown that the doctrine of petitionary 
prayer is in no way impugned by the fact that we do not have reasons to believe (or that we do not know) 
that God has answered a particular prayer. This paper develops this second response to Davison’s epistemic 
challenge. I will focus exclusively on Davison’s (2011) argument. This is because Davison’s (2011) claim 
that we never have any reason to believe that a prayer has been answered is obviously much stronger than 
the (2017) claim that maybe we do not know that a prayer has been answered. If I can show that the (2011) 
claim does not undermine the extant defenses of petitionary prayer, then it will follow that the (2017) claim 
does not either. The paper proceeds as follows. First I explain why Davison (2011) thinks that we never 
have any reason to believe that a prayer has been answered. Next, I explain how this fact allegedly 
undermines the extant defenses of petitionary prayer. Finally, I show how the defender of petitionary 
prayer may resist Davison’s argument.  
Davison makes an ingenious contribution to the literature on petitioner prayer when he takes a step 
back and asks a question the answer to which is typically taken for granted: under what conditions is it 
correct to say that God has answered a prayer? It is widely assumed that God does not answer prayers for 
bad things, so one condition on being an answered prayer is that the prayer must have been for something 
good. It is also widely assumed that for the prayer to count as answered, it must be the case that God brings 
about the thing being prayed for. These two conditions, however, might seem insufficient for answered 
prayer, since God might bring about what is being prayed for independently of the prayer. It is naturally 
(and commonly) assumed that in addition to the object of a prayer being good and being brought about by 
God, God’s bringing about the object of the prayer must depend counterfactually on the prayer. This 
additional condition completes the counterfactual dependence account of answered prayer: 
 
 The counterfactual dependence account of answered prayer: 
 S’s prayer for x is answered if and only if: 
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(i) x is good, 
(ii) God brings about x, and 
(iii) God would not have brought about x if S had not prayed for x.v 
 
The counterfactual dependence account is subject to pre-emption problems similar to those found in the 
literature on counterfactual theories of causation. Suppose that you and your aunt both pray for your 
mother's recovery from illness, your mother's recovery is a good thing, and God brings about your mother's 
recovery. It seems possible for the following two conditions to obtain: (i) God answers your prayer for your 
mother’s recovery, and (ii) even if you had not prayed for your mother’s recovery, God would have 
brought about your mother’s recovery in response to your aunt’s prayer. But according to the 
counterfactual dependence account, these two conditions cannot both obtain, since if the second condition 
obtains, then God’s bringing about your mother’s recovery does not depend counterfactually on your 
prayer; hence, God did not answer your prayer. But intuitively God can answer your prayer and also 
answer your Aunt’s prayer in such a way that God would have answered your aunt’s prayer even if you had 
not prayed (and vice versa).vi 
 To address the pre-emption problem with the counterfactual dependence account, Davison 
recommends replacing condition (iii) of the counterfactual dependence account with the condition 
characteristic of his own reasons account of answered prayer: 
 
 The reasons account of answered prayer: 
 S’s prayer for x is answered if and only if: 
(i) x is good, 
(ii) God brings about x, and 




The ‘because’ in the third condition signifies a motivating reason: to say that God brings about x at least in 
part because S prayed for x is to say that S’s praying for x constitutes a motivating reason (perhaps one 
among many) for God to bring about x. Because persons can act for a multitude of reasons, the reasons 
account does not entail counterfactual dependence of the prayer’s being answered on the prayer itself, and 
it is therefore not subject to the pre-emption problem. If you and your aunt both pray for your mother’s 
recovery from illness, God can bring about your mother’s recovery while taking both prayers into account. 
As long as God brings about your mother’s recovery at least in part because you prayed for it, and at least in 
part because your aunt prayed for it, it follows from the reasons account that God answered both prayers.viii  
 The reasons account of answered prayer seems correct, but Davison argues that it leads to 
intractable problems for the doctrine of petitionary prayer, one of which he dubs the “reasons-skeptical 
problem”. The problem is that we ordinarily have no insight into God’s reasons for doing things. If God 
brings about your mother’s recovery, we cannot know anything about why God does that. A fortiori, we 
cannot know that God brings about your mother’s recovery because someone prayed for it. Consequently, 
we cannot know that God’s bringing about your mother’s recovery constitutes an answered prayer rather 
than a coincidence. Not only can we not ordinarily know that God has answered a prayer, but it seems we 
cannot even have any reason to believe that God has answered a prayer, since we have no epistemic access to 
God’s reasons for acting in the world. Davison claims that the reasons-skeptical problem undermines the 
extant defenses of petitionary prayer. In order to evaluate that claim, we must consider briefly why 
petitionary prayer is supposed to need defending in the first place. 
Philosophers and theologians have alleged that the doctrine of petitionary prayer conflicts with the 
classical conception of God as perfectly good. The argument is roughly as follows. Suppose I ask God for 
something. If what I ask for is good all things considered, then God, being perfectly good, will provide what 
I ask for, whether or not I ask for it. If what I ask for is bad, then God, being perfectly good, will not 
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provide what I ask for, whether or not I ask for it. In either case, God does not answer my prayer. The 
(alleged) upshot is that the major theistic religions are incoherent insofar as they advocate petitionary prayer 
and also hold that God is perfectly good; meanwhile, millions of religious believers engage in and often 
center their lives around a pointless practice.ix  
A common response to the problem of divine goodness is to say that God achieves certain 
“outweighing goods” by responding to petitionary prayer. I will not discuss all the goods alleged to justify 
the doctrine of petitionary prayer, but I will focus on those goods that I take to be plausible justifications for 
making some goods contingent on prayer and that can withstand Davison’s critique. My purpose in focusing 
on these goods is not to endorse them as providing the best defense of petitionary prayer but to show how 
such defenses can generally withstand Davison’s attack. My defense can be adapted to many other 
justifications for making goods contingent on prayer, but not to all of them.x  
The practice of petitionary prayer is tied to the assumption that God is a person who responds to 
our needs when asked. Petitionary prayer therefore helps us to get into and maintain a personal relationship 
with God. Just like any relationship, one’s relationship with God would be impoverished if it did not 
include some sort of responsive element, where one party responds to the other. In our relationship with 
God this responsiveness comes by way of petitionary prayer. By making some goods dependent on 
petitionary prayer, God gives us an incentive to enter into personal interactions with God by way of 
petitionary prayer. Such an incentive might be especially useful for those who are inclined to argue that 
prayer is pointless if we are going to get what we need even if we do not pray.xi 
In the article that kick-started the literature on petitionary prayer, Eleonore Stump argues that 
making goods contingent on prayer is one way to safeguard against two dangers inherent in any relationship 
with a significant power imbalance.xii Where one person in the relationship is more powerful than the 
other, if the powerful person acts in the less powerful person’s life without restraint, then the less powerful 
person is likely to feel overwhelmed by the more powerful person and to resent the more powerful person 
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as meddlesome. However, if the more powerful person were to restrain herself by intervening only when 
asked, then the help would be welcome because requested. To use Stump’s example, if a teacher calls 
uninvited on a struggling student to help the student arrange her schedule more efficiently and to ensure the 
student is spending enough time on course material, the student might feel like the teacher is intruding. But 
if the student approaches the teacher after class and asks for help, then it would be irrational for the student 
to resent the teacher for helping. Stump also argues that God’s providing all goods automatically runs the 
risk of spoiling us, making us wilful and tyrannical.xiii By making goods contingent on prayer, God helps us 
to recognize our dependence, which elicits an attitude of gratefulness.xiv The practice of petitionary prayer 
therefore also guards against idolatry, since it forces us to recognize God as our provider.xv 
The foregoing benefits of petitionary prayer can be summarized by saying that petitionary prayer 
enriches one’s relationship with God by: 
 
1. Providing an incentive to enter into personal interactions with God 
2. Guarding against divine meddling 
3. Demonstrating our dependence on God for some goods, thereby  
a. guarding us from spoilage, and  
b. guarding us from idolatry. 
 
I will call these responses to the argument from goodness collectively ‘the relationship defenses’. 
Davison argues that all the standard responses to the argument from goodness, including the 
relationship defenses, are undermined by the reasons-skeptical problem.xvi Take them in reverse order. If 
we do not have any reason to believe that God has answered a prayer, we have no special reason to think 
that a good was dependent on God in any special way.xvii Answered prayer therefore provides no check 
against spoilage and idolatry, since it gives us no reason to think our goods come from God in any special 
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way. Davison also argues that the reasons-skeptical problem undermines the claim that making some goods 
contingent on prayer guards against divine meddling. This is because, “If we don’t know which goods God 
bestows upon us as a result of petitionary prayer (as opposed to those goods God bestows on us just because 
we need them, whether or not we ask), then we won’t know whether or not God is ‘respecting our 
boundaries’, so to speak.”xviii In other words, if we cannot know whether God has answered a prayer, then 
we cannot know that God is not in fact meddling in our lives. Davison does not discuss the first justification 
for making some goods dependent on petitionary prayer – providing an incentive to engage in personal 
interaction with God through petitionary prayer. However, it might seem that the reasons-skeptical 
problem also undermines this justification for petitionary prayer for the same reason it undermines the 
others. If we have no reason to think that God answers our prayers, we have no reason to think God will 
answer our future prayers. Accordingly, we have no incentive to pray for things. Such are the reasons why 
Davison thinks the reasons-skeptical problem undermines the above responses to the argument from 
goodness.  
Even if one agrees that we typically have no reason to believe that God has answered a prayer, the 
reasons-skeptical problem does not undermine the relationship defenses. This is because the relationship 
defenses do not require that we have reason to believe of individual prayers that God has answered or will 
answer those prayers. To see this, it is useful to distinguish between two claims: 
 
(A) For some prayer p, God has answered p; 




The reasons-skeptical problem undermines our reasons to believe (A) but not (B).1 Davison argues that God 
is justified in making (B) true only if we have a reason to believe (A). But I disagree. In order to justify 
making (B) true, it is sufficient that we have a justified belief that (B) is true; belief that (A) is true is not 
required. So if we have an independent reason to believe (B), then God is justified in making (B) true. To 
see this, consider the three relationship defenses in turn. 
 According to the first defense, God makes some goods dependent on petitionary prayer in order to 
incentivize our engaging in personal interaction with God. The personal interaction consists in our 
approaching God in prayer in order to confess our need and ask for help and, in some cases, God answering 
the prayer by providing what we ask. Knowing that God makes some goods contingent on prayer is 
sufficient to incentivize asking God for things. Consider the following analogy. Suppose you had a rich and 
influential but distant and mysterious benefactor (think of Ms. Havisham as Pip understands her for most of 
Great Expectations). This benefactor writes you a letter that reads:  
My Dear Philosopher:  
I am rich beyond compare and very influential. Whenever you need something, do write to me and let me know. 
I will answer your request if the circumstances allow it (but you must remember to write!). Unfortunately, you 
will not hear from me again, but rest assured I care for you and will answer your requests whenever possible. I 
look forward to hearing from you.  
I am, etc.  
If you received such a letter and had independent reasons to think it was legitimate, then you would have 
good reason to believe that (a) your benefactor will answer some of your requests, but (b) only if you write 
to her. Believing these things provides incentive to write to your benefactor whenever you need something. 
                                                      
1 In his later work, Davison demonstrates awareness of the distinction between (A) and (B), but he does not consider its 
importance vis-à-vis his attack on extant defenses of petitionary prayer (2017: 62, 108). 
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You would have such an incentive because you know that your benefactor will answer at least some of your 
requests, even if you do not know which of your requests she will answer.  
 However, your benefactor will not unilaterally wield her influence on your behalf. This is because 
your benefactor does not want to be meddlesome and wants to leave you a significant level of autonomy. 
Accordingly, your benefactor will wield her influence on your behalf only when you ask her to. By making 
her influence contingent on your asking, your benefactor guards against being meddlesome and advancing 
unwanted solutions to your problems. According to the second defense, the case is the same with God. 
Davison suggests that God cannot guard against being meddlesome because you do not know when God is 
helping and when not. Here it is useful to draw a distinction. There are three easily confused benefits 
associated with lack of meddling:  
 
(i) You have reason to believe that God is not meddling in your affairs; 
(ii) You do not have reason to believe that God is meddling in your affairs; 
(iii) God is not meddling in your affairs. 
 
Even if we grant that the reasons-skeptical problem undermines benefit (i), benefits (ii) and (iii) remain 
untouched by the reasons-skeptical problem. Absent special revelation and obvious miracles, we have no 
reason to believe that God is intervening on our behalf, as Davison himself argues. Accordingly, we have no 
reason to believe that God is meddling in our affairs. The fact that we have no epistemic access to God’s 
reasons does not entail or even suggest that God is meddling in our affairs. So the reasons-skeptical problem 
does not undermine benefit (ii). Benefit (iii) is completely independent of our beliefs, since God can refrain 
from meddling whether we think God meddles or not. So benefit (iii) is also untouched by the reasons-
skeptical problem. So even if the reasons-skeptical problem undermines benefit (i), it does not undermine 
benefits (ii) and (iii). And arguably, benefits (ii) and (iii) are what we are really concerned about when it 
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comes to divine meddling. If I have no reason to think that God is meddling in my affairs, and if God is in 
fact not meddling in my affairs, then I have no basis for resentment despite the significant power imbalance 
between myself and God. 
 Return now to the analogy with the rich and mysterious benefactor. Suppose you made it a habit of 
writing to your benefactor almost daily to inform her of your needs great and small. Sometimes these needs 
are met and sometimes they are not. If you have reason to believe that your benefactor is responsible for 
some of your needs being met, you might naturally begin to have a sense of gratitude toward your 
benefactor. You will not know for what it is appropriate to thank your benefactor, but it would be 
appropriate to have a general sense of gratitude. This is because you recognize that some and perhaps many 
of the good things you enjoy are due to your benefactor. Knowing that your benefactor sometimes acts on 
your behalf is therefore sufficient to recognize that some of your goods come from your benefactor. You 
depend on your benefactor for these goods, you have a sense of gratitude, and you recognize that you could 
not have had all the goods you enjoy without her help. Of course your sense of dependence and gratitude 
would be sharpened if you knew precisely for which goods your benefactor was responsible. But the fact 
remains that if you suspect that your benefactor answers some requests, then you should feel gratitude 
toward her, even if you do not know precisely for what goods you feel gratitude.  
 I conclude that the so-called reasons-skeptical problem is no problem at all. In order to reap the 
alleged benefits of petitionary prayer, it is not necessary to know exactly which prayers God answers; it is 
sufficient to have reason to believe that God answers some prayers for goods that are contingent on those 
prayers. Whether religious believers are justified in believing the latter claim, however, is another 
question.xix 





Basinger, David. 1995. “Petitionary Prayer: A Response to Murray and Meyers.” Religious Studies 31: 475–
484. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20019775  
Basinger, David. 2004. “God Does Not Respond to Petitionary Prayer.” In Contemporary Debates in Philosophy 
of Religion, edited by Michael Peterson and Raymond VanArragon (Blackwell), 255–264.  
Choi, Isaac. 2016. “Is Petitionary Prayer Superfluous?” In Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion, edited by 
Jonathan Kvanvig (Oxford), 32–62. doi: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198757702.003.0002  
Davison, Scott. 2011. “Petitionary Prayer.” In The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Theology, edited by 
Thomas Flint and Michael Rea (Oxford), 286–305. doi: 
10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199596539.013.0014  
Davison, Scott. 2017. Petitionary Prayer: A Philosophical Investigation (Oxford). doi: 
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198757740.001.0001 
Franks, W. Paul. 2009. “Why a Believer Could Believe That God Answers Prayers.” Sophia 48: 319–24. 
doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11841-009-0117-4 
Hoffman, Joshua. 1985. “On Petitionary Prayer.” Faith and Philosophy 2: 21–29. 
Howard-Snyder, Daniel, and Frances Howard-Snyder. 2010. “The Puzzle of Petitionary Prayer.” European 
Journal for Philosophy of Religion 2: 43–68. 
Murray, Michael J. 2004. “God Responds to Petitionary Prayer.” In Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of 
Religion, edited by Raymond VanArragon Michael Peterson (Blackwell), 242–255. 
Murray, Michael J. and Kurt Meyers. 1994. “Ask and It Shall be Given to You.” Religious Studies 30: 311–
330. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0034412500022927  




Smith, Nicholas, and Andrew Yip. 2010. “Partnership with God: A Partial Solution to the Problem of 
Petitionary Prayer.” Religious Studies 46: 395–410. doi:10.1017/S0034412509990412  
Stump, Eleonore. 1979. “Petitionary Prayer.” American Philosophical Quarterly 16: 81–91.  
http://www.jstor.org/stable/20009745  
Stump, Eleonore. 1985. “Hoffman on Petitionary Prayer.” Faith and Philosophy 2: 30–37. 
Aquinas, Thomas. 1882-. Opera omnia, ed. Leonine Commission (Comissio Leonina). 
Veber, Michael. 2007. “Why Even a Believer Should Not Believe That God Answers Prayers.” Sophia 46: 
177–187. doi: 10.1007/s11841-007-0021-8  
 
                                                      
i Davison, “Petitionary Prayer,” 298. For an overview of the literature, see Smith, “Philosophical 
Reflections”. In addition to the works cited below, helpful entries to the debate include Basinger, 
“Petitionary Prayer” and “God Does Note Respond”; Franks, “Why a Believer Could Believe”; Hoffman, 
“On Petitionary Prayer”; Smith and Yip, “Partnership with God”; Stump, “Hoffman on Petitionary Prayer”; 
Veber, “Why Even a Believer Should Not Believe.” 
ii Davison, Petitionary Prayer, ch. 4. 
iii Davison, Petitionary Prayer, 18. 
iv Choi, “Is Petitionary Prayer Superfluous?” 
v Davison’s version of the counterfactual dependence account omits condition (ii). Doing so opens the 
counterfactual dependence account open to even more problems (Davison, “Petitionary Prayer,” 288), 
which are easily avoided by including condition (ii).  
vi Here I am thinking of prayers as utterances. The same point can be made, mutatis mutandis, thinking of 
prayers as the contents of utterances. 
  
13 
                                                                                                                                                                           
vii Davison, “Petitionary Prayer,” 288. In Petitionary Prayer, ch. 4, Davison finds fault with the reasons 
account on the grounds that it “does not explain the sense in which a petitionary prayer must make some 
kind of difference in order to count as having been answered by God” (34). Davison’s reason for this claim 
is that on the reasons account, the fact that someone prayed for something might constitute only a very 
slight reason for God to do something, in which case the prayer does not really make a difference. To 
address this problem, Davison replaces the reasons account with the contrastive reasons account: 
 
CRA: S’s petitionary prayer (token) for an object E is answered by God if and only if God’s desire 
to bring about E just because S requested it plays an essential role in a true contrastive explanation 
of God’s bringing about E rather than not.  
 
The difference between the reasons account and the contrastive reasons account is irrelevant with respect to 
Davison’s epistemic challenge, and I will focus on the reasons account for simplicity. But it is worth noting 
that CRA faces a serious difficulty. Suppose that God has no independent reason to provide my son a 
jackknife, but I organize a prayer meeting in which 12 million people pray for my son to receive a jackknife. 
It seems possible for God to answer our prayers, although each prayer (token) constitutes only a very slight 
reason for God to provide my son a jackknife. Davison seems to think that in such a case, no prayer token 
plays an essential role in a true contrastive explanation of God’s providing my son a jackknife. If not, it 
follows that God did not answer anyone’s prayer, although God did provide my son a jackknife because of 
all those prayers. But if any of the 12 million prayer tokens does play an essential role in a true contrastive 
explanation of God’s providing my son a jackknife, then a very slight reason can play such a role, and CRA 
faces the same “problem” that the reasons account faces.  
  
14 
                                                                                                                                                                           
viii In Petitionary Prayer, Davison distinguishes between answering a prayer and responding to a prayer. 
Answering a prayer requires providing the object of the prayer. One can respond to a prayer by merely 
saying ‘no’ (10). 
ix Several non-equivalent versions of this argument are often conflated in the literature: some conclude that 
God does not answer petitionary prayers; some conclude that even if God does answer petitionary prayers, 
such prayers are pointless; and some simply pose the question, why would God institute the practice of 
petitionary prayer? Because I am focusing on the responses to these arguments, I will not discuss the 
nuanced differences between them.  
x Howard-Snyder and Howard-Snyder also respond to Davison’s arguments, but their arguments are 
different from mine (“The Puzzle of Petitionary Prayer”). 
xi A similar point is made in different terms by Murray and Meyers, “Ask and It Shall Be Given,” 315, and by 
Choi, “Is Petitionary Prayer Superfluous?,” 40. 
xii Stump, “Petitionary Prayer.” 
xiii Stump, “Petitionary Prayer,” 89; Murray and Meyers, “Ask and It Shall be Given,” 316. 
xiv A similar line can be found in Aquinas, ST II, 83:2. 
xv Murray and Meyers, “Ask and It Shall Be Given,” 313-14; Murray, “God Responds.” 
xvi Davison, “Petitionary Prayer.” As mentioned above, Davison tempers this claim in Petitionary Prayer; in 
the end it is not clear how strongly he intends it to be taken. 
xvii We might have independent reason to think that everything is dependent on God as conserver of the 
universe, but whatever sense of dependence is involved in divine conservation is independent of petitionary 
prayer and so not relevant here. 
xviii Davison, “Petitionary Prayer,” 296. 
  
15 
                                                                                                                                                                           
xix This paper was inspired by a fall 2016 course on philosophy of religion at the University of Toronto. 
Thanks to my excellent students for much stimulating discussion on this and other topics. The main idea of 
the paper was born from discussion of the topic with my wife, Megan Embry. Thanks to members of the 
University of Toronto philosophy of religion reading group, Klaas Kraay, Bryan Reece, Mark Murphy, and 
an anonymous referee for valuable suggestions. 
